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1 Introduction
The aims of Defineit is to produce tools necessary to determine the econom-
ically optimal level of exploitation of European marine ecosystems, while
ensuring that the pressure exerted on the stocks is biologically sustain-
able (Definiet, 2009, p. 5). An aim of the project is therefore to develop
resource indicators by combine for example economic and biology into in-
dicators that relates directly to the benefit of the society (Definiet, 2009,
p. 6). The objective of this paper is develop indicators for use in respon-
sive management as tool for improving the benefit the marine ecosystem
provide society. Other work package in the project will produce ecosystem
and multi-species models, while cost and price information is collected as
an other task. Present report therefore depart from the existence of a bi-
ological model as well as net price information, based hereupon indicators
suitable for responsive management are developed.
Many previous developed economic indicators for fishing focus on the
output and efficiency of the fleet (e.g. Accadia and Spagnolo, 2006; Hoff
et al., 2009). In this paper a different approach is taken: We focus on
the marine ecosystem as a capital and ask: “Is this capital of the right
composition and size?” Tradition has that capital theoretic approaches shall
find the optimal composition and size of the system, and the control path to
this, that is: how to get there (e.g. Clark and Munro, 1975). As we in this
paper is only try to improve the capital, the ambition is more modest than
optimal control. However, it is the idea to develop indicators useful in a
world where management decision is made through negotiations with many
stake holders, the knowledge of the ecosystem is updated regularly and the
decision makers time horizon is limited. Therefore it is indicators that test if
the state of the ecosystem can be improved, from an economic point of view,
that has focus in present work. The key stone for the indicators will be the
value of the ecosystem. The value in it self is not of any special interest, it is
the potential improvement in value created by management decisions that
is of interests. In section 2 a method to calculate the value of the ecosystem
is developed, and test in a simple model by letting a management taking
decision on yearly basis. In section 3 the value of ecosystem is used to
develop indicators that describe the state of the ecosystem, and therefore
implicit evaluates the past management that created present state. The
indicators can, however, be used to improve the management as well, as
they specific point to where improvement can be made. Finally, in section
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4, a retrospective indicator is developed, an indicator that can evaluate, for
example, last years management as a whole.
2 Value of ecosystem
In the following it is expected that there exits a model of the ecosystem
able to predict the future amount of fish given a fishery. The fish in the
model are stratified into for example spices, size or age. The strata are
numbered with i and the stock of fish is a vector x with element xi. The
removable from the sea, harvest and discard, is yi collected in the vector y.
The ecosystem model can then be described as
dxi
dt
= fi(x, . . .)− yi (1)
where fi(x, . . .) is the predicted growth and “ . . .” represents external factors,
that will be disregarded below.
The first indicator to be considered is the value of the ecosystem. The
value of the ecosystem is not of any interest by it self (unless the ecosystem
is up for sale), however, if a set of different management actions is available
and have to be compared, the execution of each actions will lead to different
expected state of the ecosystem. To value the different management actions,
the difference in the value of the final states of the ecosystem has to be
accounted for; to do this there is a need for valuation of the ecosystem.
The purpose of the valuation of the ecosystem is then to tell the difference
in value between state of the ecosystem relative close to each other in the
space of x.
Valuation of natural resources was formalized by Faustmann (1849) and
(in modern continues notation) defined as:
C =
ˆ ∞
0
e−δtu(t) dt
where u(t) is the utility derived from the resource at time t and δ is the
discount rate. The integral sums the discounted net benefit from the re-
source from now into infinity and is then the true value of the resource as a
capital, it is therefore referred to as capital value. If it is the capital value
from a social point of view, the discount rate δ will be the social discount
rate, and u will be the utility for the society.
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If the ecosystem is represented by the model (1) the harvest can be
written as
y(t) = f(x(t))− x˙(t) (2)
If the direct benefit is a function of the harvest, the utility function can be
written as
u(t) = u(x(t), x˙(t))
Formulated like this the utility is a function of the stock x and how the
stock will develop in time x˙. What management will decide on is how the
development in stock x˙ has to be. The capital value will then be
C =
ˆ ∞
0
e−δtu(x, x˙) dt (3)
In the definition of capital value as written in (3), the capital can develop
in all directions and give at lot of different values of capital value. These
differences will, however, not value the capital x per se, but is rather a
valuation of the rules for how x˙ shall be set. The situation where x˙ = 0 is
a special situation: Here the capital is constant and the use of the resource
is, as natural capital is constant, per definition sustainable in economic sens.
In present work the situation of stationery capital, that is x˙ = 0, is seen as
the ideal benchmark for evaluation of the system.
2.1 Stationery Capital
With a situation where capital is constant x˙ = 0 as benchmark, the system
can be examined by a analyze known as Stationery Rate of Return on
Capital (Weitzman, 2003). The analyze can examine if it is possibly to
make improvements by changing the capital level, where the improvements
is measured by the value of capital.
If a small change ∆xi of the capital at strata i is made, the immediate
benefit is ∆xi ∂u(x,0)∂x˙i while the long term consequence can be summaries as
∆xi
∂C
∂xi
∣∣∣
x˙=0
. The analyze of stationery capital can then be summarized as
the marginal net benefit from a change in xi
Bi =
∂u(x,0)
∂x˙i
+
∂C
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
x˙=0
(4)
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If Bi is positive the value of the marginal harvest fish in strata i is more
valuable in the sea as capital compared with harvested, and vice versa. If
Bi = 0 for all i the system is in a stationery point, in the sense of calculus,
that may be optimal. For a interpretation of (4) remember that in the model
(1) dxi is equivalent with - dyi — the harvest yi has the same decline as the
increase in capital x˙i. The first part is then minus the marginal utility of a
fish i when harvest, and the second part is the change in capital value if the
marginal fish i is left in the sea, under a stationary capital. The last part
is then the opportunity value of the fish. If Vi is the marginal net value
Bi = −Vi + ζi (5)
Where: ζi =
∂C
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
x˙=0
(6)
The stationery capital analyze above seems strait forward, however, in
many biological models it will not make sens to have constant capital x˙ = 0
because there will be some growth fi(x) where it is not reasonable to har-
vest. This may be because the size of the fish is to small, because it is not
a commercial fished species, or it may not be profitable to fish it. This can
be summarized in the social net value Vi being negative. To apply an ana-
lyze, equivalent to the stationery capital analyze, to models where it is not
economic reasonable to fish on all strata, the concept of stationery capital
has to be approximated with a pseudo stationery capital, that is, at situa-
tion as closes to a static system that is economical reasonable. Economic
reasonable will be only to exploit fish from strata with positive net value:
Only if Vi ≥ 0 is the strata i exploited. The pseudo stationery capital is
then defined as a situation where
i under exploitation =⇒ dxi
dt
= 0
alternatively the pseudo steady capital is defined as
yi =
{
fi(x) if Vi ≥ 0
0 else
(7)
The value of the ecosystem can then be defined as:
C =
ˆ ∞
0
u(t) e−δt dt
∣∣∣∣∣ dxidt = 0 ∀ i under exploitation (8)
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This paper first examines if this definition of capital value of the ecosys-
tem under a pseudo stationery capital can be used as guardian to improve
the capital level, and what kind of indicators can be developed base on this
definition.
The stationery capital analyze is not an optimization tool, the analyze
examines if improvement can be made given the new state is stationery as
well. This may lead to a optimal capital level if all strata has a Bi = 0.
However, if optimum is not with stationery capital, it will not be examined
and found by the analyze. Further a state where B = 0 is only a indication
of a stationery situation, it may be a saddle point, a local minimum or a
local maximum. The situation of local minimum or saddle points can be
identified and avoided by examine points in the space close to x, however,
a local maximum can be hard too identify as not a global maximum.
An alternative to stationery capital analyze is optimal control analyze.
Here the optimal x˙(t) is found from now into infinity. The analyze can
be highly complicated and solution for more complicated system as three
coupled differential equations (Flaaten, 1988) and in single species cohort
model (Botsford, 1981; Tahvonen, 2009) is not accomplished. The models
used in the Defineit project, multi-species cohort model and multi-species
sized based models, are at present beyond the capacity of the methods to
solve the optimal control problem. Further, the validity of the biological
and economic models is confined to subset of state space where data is
available; but optimal control path can only be found in models where the
validity of the model can be expected in the entire state space. If the model
available do not have the global validity, adaptive management by gradually
improving the capital level with in the validity of the models may be the
best option.
2.2 Responsive Management and Test
To test if the definition (8) can be used to improve the capital level and
in the end achieve economical optimal exploitation, the definition (8) is in
this section tested in a responsive management. The management have a
limited time horizon of one year, that is, the responsive management will
set the harvest for only one year at a time. The harvest will be set by
maximizing the present value of next years harvest plus the value of the
11
Table 1: Parameters in the test model. After Ragozin and Brown (1985)
Parameter Value Unit
a 0.36 year−1
b 0.88× 10−8 ton−1year−1
c 0.35 year−1
d 0.35× 10−8 ton−1year−1
α 0.35× 10−8 ton−1year−1
β 0.12× 10−8 ton−1year−1
δ 0.05 year−1
p 1 $ ton−1
q 107 $
system at the end of the year:
Objective: max
y
(ˆ 1
0
y · V e−δt dt+ e−δC1
)
(9)
st: x(0) = x0
dxi
dt
= fi(x, . . .)− yi
where C1 is the value of the system at year 1 calculated by (8)
The benchmark when testing the responsive management is Optimal
Control Theory (Clark and Munro, 1975). The responsive management
is therefore applied to a model where the optimal path is known and the
results can be compared. A predator–prey model of the Lotka–Volterra
type is used.
f1 = x1 (a− bx1 + αx2)
f2 = x2 (c− dx1 − βx2)
The predator stock is x1 and the prey stock is x2. If there is fishery on
both species this type of model is relative simple, however, if the fishery is
limited to the predator
y =
(
y1
0
)
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Figure 1: Predator prey diagram. The diagram gives the optimal state of
the predator and prey system with the point ⊗. The dash line indicates the
singular path according to the optimal control; to the left of the line the
optimal control is zero harvest and to right it is maximum possibly harvest.
The bold line indicates a optimal control path from the point marked 0
towards the ⊗ point. The line and points marked with numbers indicates
the path of a responsive management only looking one year ahead. The
numbers indicates years. The gray area indicates where the net value of the
predator is negative.
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the model poses a lag effect because only x1 can be kept constant in the
calculations in (8). The net value function is:
V =
(
p− q
x1
0
)
(10)
The model and parameters follows Ragozin and Brown (1985) and are
given in Table 1. Ragozin and Brown solved the optimal control problem
and discuss the value of the not commercial prey in form of the shadow
price. With this formulation of the value function (10), the optimal control
solution is a bang-bang solution: Only along a singular path the harvest
has to be differentiated. To the left of the singular path (that is for smaller
x1) the optimal control is y1 = 0 and to the right of the singular path the
optimal harvest is the maximum possibly with the available fishing capital.
Bellow a discount rate at δ = 0.05, as used in Ragozin and Brown (1985), is
adopted. This is only for compare with Ragozin and Brown’s calculations,
not a general acceptance of this rate.
The system has with a social discount rate δ = 0.05 the optimal stock
state of x = (38 888 146, 86 666 922) as the ⊗ point in the Figure 1 and
the singular path as the dash line. To the left of this line the optimal
control is y1 = 0 and to the right the harvest shall be maximum with the
available fishing capital. The point of departure for the benchmark is a
point with very low stock x = (1 040 370, 3 101 652). Form this point the
optimal approach is y1 = 0 for around 9½ years as illustrated by the bold
line in Figure 1, and then along the singular path towards the ⊗ point.
When successive applying the responsive method for one year at a time,
the responsive management will follow the line with ◦ points in Figure 1.
The points indicate the start of a year and the numbers give the time in
years.
In the diagram it is seen that responsive management with one year
planing of harvest follows the optimal path for the nine first years. In these
nine years neither of the approaches will harvest. After the zero harvest
period the responsive management is, compared with the optimal path,
a little to slow to pick up the fishery. But, after year 12 the responsive
management follows a path directly approaching the optimal point ⊗. The
net present value of the responsive management is 97% of the net present
value of the optimal path.
In the Table 2 the first 25 years of the responsive management is sum-
marized. The first column indicate the year where management decide on
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Table 2: Data from the responsive management. First column is the time
in years, second column indicates if net value of a harvest is positive, third
column gives the responsive management harvest relative to the sustainable
harvest. Column 4–6 gives indicators of the state of the system under the
assumption of sustainable yield; fourth column gives the net social benefit,
fifth column gives the implicit discount rate and the sixth gives the indicator
rate w. When net value is negative the implicit discount rate and w is not
defined hence a — is given in the columns.
year V1 > 0 y1/f1 B1 ρ1 w1
0 FALSE 0.0000 20.1753 — —
1 FALSE 0.0000 17.7409 — —
2 FALSE 0.0000 15.9564 — —
3 FALSE 0.0000 14.5563 — —
4 FALSE 0.0000 13.3260 — —
5 FALSE 0.0000 12.0783 — —
6 TRUE 0.0000 10.6407 4.8371 7.5590
7 TRUE 0.0000 8.8588 0.9199 1.3613
8 TRUE 0.0000 6.6251 0.4913 0.6891
9 TRUE 0.0000 3.9317 0.2693 0.3578
10 TRUE 0.6959 0.9194 0.0965 0.1140
11 TRUE 0.9767 0.0406 0.0521 0.0528
12 TRUE 0.9806 0.0408 0.0523 0.0528
13 TRUE 0.9855 0.0335 0.0520 0.0523
14 TRUE 0.9892 0.0273 0.0517 0.0518
15 TRUE 0.9920 0.0221 0.0515 0.0515
16 TRUE 0.9941 0.0180 0.0512 0.0512
17 TRUE 0.9956 0.0147 0.0510 0.0510
18 TRUE 0.9968 0.0121 0.0508 0.0508
19 TRUE 0.9976 0.0102 0.0508 0.0507
20 TRUE 0.9982 0.0087 0.0507 0.0506
21 TRUE 0.9987 0.0076 0.0506 0.0505
22 TRUE 0.9990 0.0068 0.0505 0.0505
23 TRUE 0.9993 0.0061 0.0505 0.0504
24 TRUE 0.9995 0.0057 0.0504 0.0504
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next years harvest. Next column indicates if the net value of fishery is pos-
itive. If this is FALSE there is no need to do more calculation, any fishery
will yield negative rent. If it is positive the objective 9 is maximized and
in the third column the ratio between next years harvest and the f1(x) is
given. The harvest is 0 until year 10 where there is a harvest of 70% of
f1. Next year the harvest is increased to 98% of f1 and thereafter slowly
increasing, however, the stock of x1 continues to increase as all ratio y1/f1 is
below 1. The three next columns are discussed in later section.
2.3 Discussion
The above test of using (8) for valuing the ecosystem illustrate the useful-
ness of the concept capital value under a pseudo stationery capital. The
consequences of a management action, here deciding on next years harvest,
can easily be done in a relative simple manner. The other alternative will
be to use the net present value given a optimal control path in the future.
The later have three problems: 1) The biological models may not be solv-
able by optimal control method, 2) it implicit assumes a commitment from
management to plan into infinity and follow the optimal control path, and
3) the net present value of the optimal path is partly valuing the control
path that there is no commitment for (point 2). The definition of the capi-
tal value used here assumes only a commitment of sustainability, and values
the state of the system as it is.
The test is preformed on a relative simple model. The difference in
present value of around 3% is acceptable and probably far below the error
originating from the dispersion in the biological and economic model. The
test show that the pseudo stationery capital valuation do not lead to sub-
stantial lose in present value and therefore acceptable, however, this only
apply for the specific model. The cost function used above is linear, lead-
ing to the bang-bang solution of the optimal path. A more realistic cost
function can be used with some modification in the definition of pseudo
stationery capital (7). With increasing marginal harvest cost, the rule will
be either to harvest as much as is profitable or fi, which ever is smallest:
yi = max
(
0,min
(
fi(x), yi|Vi(yi)=0
))
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3 Ecosystem State Indicators
With background in the definition (8) of the value of the ecosystem under
pseudo stationery capital, indicators that test the state of single strata i are
developed in the following paragraphs. The basic idea is that it is the state
of each strata that is valuated, and the indicators examines if this state can
be improvement.
3.1 Net social benefit
The first indicator to be discussed is the net social benefit of increasing the
capital xi, already defined in (5). The only difference difference from (5) is
that the opportunity cost is measured as the partial deviate of the capital
value under a pseudo stationery capital
Bi = ζi − Vi (11)
Where: ζi =
∂C
∂xi
(12)
and C is mesured by (8) (13)
In Table (2) the fourth column marked B1 indicates the marginal net
social benefit of increasing the stock of xi. The values are all positive,
indicating that the harvest has to be lower than growth f1. The values are,
compared with the price of 1, large in the start, decreasing around year
10 to small values, corresponding to when the fishery starts. The B is not
confined to be calculate along a specific path, but can be calculated for the
entire space of possibly states of x. I Figure 2 B1 is given for the predator
prey space. As the 0 contour line is not following the optimal path in the
figure (the dash line), the figure illustrates the difference between optimal
control where a path is found, and the responsive management based on
the pseudo stationery capital approach, where only improvement in the
capital level is sought. However policies based on the B1 in the figure will
lead towards better utilization of the resource, and in this case towards the
global optimum.
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Figure 2: B1 contours i the state space. The bold line is the B1 = 0
contour, to the right of the zero contour B1 is negative −2,−4,−6, . . . and
to the left positive 2, 4, 6 .
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3.2 Implicit discount rate
The marginal net social benefit indicates by it’s sign whether xi should
be increased or decreased, however, the magnitude of B1 may be of little
interest as it depends on the specific net price of fish in the strata. Here
the return on the investment of a marginal increase of xi may be more
appropriated. The rate of return on an investment is the discount rate that
make the investment decision indifferent. In a social context that is when
net social benefit is zero. The rate of return can then be found as:
ρi = ρ
∣∣∣Bi(ρ) = 0
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In the calculation of Bi only the calculation of opportunity cost involves
discounting so
ρi = ρ
∣∣∣
ζi(ρ) = Vi
= ρ
∣∣∣ ∂ ´∞0 u(t) e−ρt dt
∂xi
= Vi
(14)
As the state of the ecosystem is a result of previous management actions,
the rate of return ρi reveals the implicit time preference of the managers.
It can then also be perceived as the implicit discount rate. The implicit
discount rate is not defined if the signs of ζi and Vi are not the same or
one is zero, this can happen in an under utilized system where ζi can be
negative for all ρ, in a subsidized system where Vi can be negative, or in
the case where yi is discarded. In the discard case Vi can be zero, but may
be positive due to reduced cost of catching the target fish. If the implicit
discount rate is compared with the social discount rate the following rule
can be applied
If ζi < 0 Decrease xi
If ρi < δ Decrease xi
If ρi > δ Increase xi
If Vi ≤ 0 Increase xi
In Table 2 the fifth column marked ρ1 indicates the implicit discount
rate of removing one fish more than keeping the stock constant. The values
are not defined when the net value is negative. After year 6, when the net
prise gets positive, values are all higher than the social discount rate. This
indicating that investment in the resource is a good idea, that is, harvest has
to be lower than growth. The implicit discount rates are, compared with the
used social discount rate, large in the start and decreasing around year 10
to values comparable with social discount rate. The implicit discount rate is
not confined calculated to a specific path but can be calculated for the entire
space of possibly states of x. I Figure 3 the implicit discount rate is given
for the predator prey space. As the 0.05 contour line is not following the
optimal path in the figure (the dash line), the figure illustrates the difference
between optimal control where a path is found, and the pseudo stationery
19
Figure 3: Implicit discount rate contour in state space. The bold line in-
dicates ρ = 0.05, to the right is a 0.01 contour and to the left 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1
and 2 contours.
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capital approach, where improvement in the capital level is sought. The
0.05 contour line corresponds to the B1 = 0 line in Figure 2.
3.3 Indicator rate
If it was possibly to have a total stationery capital, the capital value can
be reduced to
C =
ˆ ∞
0
e−δtu(x,0) dt
= δ−1u(x,0)
20
The shadow price can then be found as
ζi =
∂C
∂xi
= δ−1
∂u(x,0)
∂xi
The rate of return defined in (14) is then
ρi =
∂u(x,0)
∂xi
Vi
= δ
ζi
Vi
The implicit discount rate found in this way is only valid for a true sta-
tionery capital. With a pseudo stationery capital the same approach can
be used to make an approximation for the implicit discount rate referred to
as an indicator rate
wi = δ
ζi
Vi
This indicator rate will give an approximation of the return on a investment
by increasing stock i.
In Table 2 the sixth column marked w1 gives the the indicator rate.
The values are all comparable to the implicit discount rate, especially when
close to the social discount rate. I Figure 3 the implicit discount rate is
given for the predator prey space. The figure shows that the contours have
the shape of the B1 in Figure 2. The indicator rate is actually the shadow
price scaled relative to the net value and scaled according to the discount
rate. Thus the indicator rate w gives the same information as the B but
scaled to gives values that can be interpreted as approximation of implicit
discount rates.
3.4 Discussion of state indicators
The value of the shadow price, an hence the B, as defined in present paper,
is not the same as the values found in optimal control theory. For exam-
ple, at start of year 7, the opportunity value of predator ζ1 = 9.20 and of
prey ζ2 = 0.14 while the shadow value found in optimal control theory is
λ1 = 0.70 and λ2 = 0.57. This difference is because the optimal control
21
Figure 4: Indicator rate contours in state space. The bold line indicates
ρ = 0.05, to the right is a 0.01 contour and to the left 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1 and 2
contours.
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has a commitment from the management to follow optimal path in the fu-
ture, while the opportunity values have a commitment of pseudo stationery
capital. Thus the opportunity cost ζ calculated as in (11) gives the im-
provement of the capitalized rent if the stock is increased with one more
ton, given a pseudo stationery capital. The shadow value λ gives the value
of one more ton given an optimal control in the future. Hence, like the the
net present value, the λ is partly valuing future control. If management do
not have the commitment of optimal control, there seems to be little reason
to expect that in the calculations, if management, on the other hand, do
have a commitment for the future management, this can be incorporated
in the model and typically shadow prices will be smaller if management do
22
have a long-term commitment of improving net benefit.
The developed indicators is indicators for the state of the ecosystem
as a capital. They indicate if the value of the system can be improved.
As such they do only indicate if next years harvest ought to be above, at,
or below the sustainable harvest. There is a tradition of developing in-
dicators into traffic signals: if they are good they are green, if they are
bad they are red, if they are yellow they are approaching the good. The
marginal net social benefit B is not good for traffic signal, because the
magnitude of the B is depending on the value of the fish. The implicit
discount rate ρ is better as it can be compared with the social discount
rate δ directly. In Figure 5 the state space is green between implicit dis-
count rate 0.03 year−1and 0.07 year−1, yellow between implicit discount rate
0.07 year−1and 0.11 year−1, and red above 0.11 year−1. In the model used
here it seems that a harvest of zero in the red zone, a harvest of around 50%
of sustainable harvest in the yellow zone and close to sustainable harvest in
the green zone is appropriate.
The implicit discount rate involves root finding and the indicator rate
w is introduced to ease calculations. If the Table 2 is examined the implicit
discount rate and w are very close, especially when approaching the social
discount rate. In Figure 5 the contours of w is drawn for the same value
as used for the implicit discount rate: 0.03, 0.07 and 0.11. As the figure
illustrates the w is a very good approximation for ρ.
4 Retrospective indicators
As the valuation method in (8) can be used for planing, it can as well be
used for retrospective evaluation of management of, for example, the last
year. To set up accounting for the year both income, change in capital
and opportunity cost of capital has to be included. The actual net rent
to society is V · y, and the value of the ecosystem have changed from C−1
to C0. The opportunity cost of the capital value C−1 is expected return
if used in other part of the society, that is δC−1. This is also the value
of the output from the ecosystem that can be expected if the ecosystem is
unchanged between the periods. Both the net income and the opportunity
cost of capital are flows and have to be integrated and discounted to get
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Figure 5: Traffic light system applied to the implicit discount rate. The
state space is colored green with ρ ∈ [0.01, 0.07], yellow for ρ ∈ [0.07, 0.11]
and red for ρ > 0.11, corresponding to a social discount rate δ = 0.05, The
black line are indicator rate w contours for 0.01, 0.07 and 0.11
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the result of the year:
Π =
ˆ 0
−1
e−δt (V · y − δC−1) dt+ C0 − C−1
=
ˆ 0
−1
e−δtV · y dt+ C0 − eδC−1
This result Π evaluates if there is generated extra welfare from the resource
or the resource is used for shortsighted purpose. The result can always be
done better and as compare the optimal harvest patten for last year can be
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found:
?
y = argmax
y
ˆ 0
−1
e−δtV · y dt+ C0|y
st: x(−1) = x−1
dxi
dt
= fi(x, . . .)− yi
And the optimal result of the year can be found as
?
Π =
ˆ 0
−1
e−δtV · ?y dt+ C
0|?y − eδC−1
The difference between the two will indicate a forgone earning to society
Forgone earning =
?
Π− Π
It will be impossibly to archive zero in forgone earning, but a large value
will indicate a mall preforming management.
The ratio between the two results
pi =
Π
?
Π
may be a better indicator of the preforms of the management the last year.
It will be impossibly to archive 100%, and how good it is possibly to preform
is dependent on the accuracy of the models and other available information.
I will until tested in models and management suggest:
Green if pi > 75%
Yellow if 75% > pi > 50%
Red if 50% > pi
5 Conclusion
Valuing the marine ecosystem under a pseudo stationery capital (8) gives
the possibility for responsive management, for example, in cases where the
validity of the biological and economic model is confined to a subset of state
space. The responsive management can also be is also be useful if the time
horizon of the managers is limited, as illustrated in section 2.2.
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As the indicators Bi, ρi and wi evaluates the state of the system, they
implicit evaluates the management that created this state. If an overall
indicator of management is needed an retrospective indicator is suggested:
The preferment indicator pi. pi gives the ration between the actual result
and the the result under best management.
In this report a simple model has been used for tests. This, however,
proves not the appropriateness in real world situations. For this the method
has to be applied to the complex model of the real world. It is the authors’
hope that these indicators can be shown useful and be included in ICES’
stock assessment reports and in STECF’s impact analyse.
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